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Abstract
As wireless ad hoc and mobile networks are emerging and the transferred data become more sensitive,
information security measures should make use of all the available contextual resources to secure information
flows. The physical layer security framework provides models, algorithms, and proofs of concept for generating
pairwise symmetric keys over single links between two nodes within communication range. In this study, we focus
on cooperative group key generation over multiple Impulse Radio - Ultra Wideband (IR-UWB) channels according
to the source model. The main idea, proposed in previous work, consists in generating receiver-specific signals,
also called s-signals, so that only the intended receiver has access to the non-observable channels corresponding
to its non-adjacent links. Herein, we complete the analysis of the proposed protocol and investigate several signal
processing algorithms to generate the s-signal expressed as a solution to a deconvolution problem in the case of
IR-UWB. Our findings indicate that it is compulsory to add a parameterizable constraint to the searched s-signal
and that the Expectation-Maximization algorithm can provide a stable self-parameterizable solution. Compared to
physical layer key distribution methods, the proposed key generation protocol requires less traffic overhead for
small cooperative groups while being robust at medium and high signal-to-noise ratios.
Index Terms
Physical layer secret key generation, Group key, Deconvolution, Expectation-maximization, Channel probing,
Impulse Radio-Ultra Wideband, Ad Hoc Wireless Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
A considerable amount of data is generated, exchanged, and collected in modern device-centric ap-
plications such as context-aware services in Smart Cities, nomadic socialized Internet of Things (IoT),
advanced human/machine-to-machine interfaces and communications, participatory sensing and environ-
ment monitoring for Big Data analysis, local multi-agent cooperative data fusion, Cooperative Intelligent
Transportation Systems (C-ITS). These applications will require emerging networks that have to carry
confidential information between mobile users in ad-hoc scenarios or from remote sensors to a core-
network.
Most wireless networks capable of supporting such applications naturally require peer-to-peer interac-
tions between end-devices under opportunistic connectivity conditions. This type of scenarios are foreseen
by WiFi Direct and Device-to-Device (D2D) options in pending 5G standards, IEEE 802.11p-compliant
Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs), and short range technologies such as Near Field Communications
(NFC), Bluetooth-Low Energy (BT-LE), IEEE 802.15.4 (Zigbee), IEEE 802.15.4a or IEEE 802.15.6
Impulse Radio - Ultra Wideband (IR-UWB). Highly susceptible to eavesdropping and impersonation
attacks by nature, these emerging wireless networks might also be subject to hardly predictable mobility
patterns, erratic users’ activity, and varying devices densities, hence requiring flexible and scalable security
measures.
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2Currently, communication systems rely mainly on high layer symmetric cryptography (based on common
secret keys) for data encryption/decryption and on Public Key Cryptography (PKC) for authentication and
symmetric key distribution [1]. However, in wireless decentralized or ad hoc networks, symmetric key
distribution with PKC is deemed challenging. Besides requiring high computational complexity from
both implementation and execution perspectives, PKC needs a centralized certified management entity to
distribute, refresh and revoke keys or signatures. The latter might be problematic when mobile devices
erratically associate or leave the local network assuming short-range physical connectivity.
Alternative approaches for symmetric key management in decentralized networks include: i) the Diffie-
Hellman (DH) protocol for pairwise key distribution or its extensions to group key distribution [2]; ii) low
complexity variants of PKC with preliminary secure distribution of location-based private keys [3]; iii)
pre-distribution of keying materials at the devices of interest in the deployment phase. It can be noticed
that these options require preliminary keying material for generating group keys and become therefore
challenging in ad hoc or mobile scenarios with opportunistic connections.
Independently or in support of the aforementioned methods, the physical layer key generation paradigm
(PLKG) [4] and its different models (i.e., source, channel, mixed [5]) have been recently put forward start-
ing from information-theoretic studies of secret sharing [6] [7]. Furthermore, some of the PLKG models
have been adapted to cooperative scenarios involving several nodes, either to reinforce the generated
pairwise keys or to issue a common group key (i.e., shared by more than two nodes).
In the source model of PLKG, on which we focus in this paper, pairwise symmetric keys can be gen-
erated after bilaterally measuring the wireless random1 channel between two concerned nodes, quantizing
it, and correcting the possible errors. The operation of channel measurement between a transmitter and a
receiver is also known as channel probing or channel sounding. In this paper, we investigate cooperative
group key generation from IR-UWB multipath channels according to the source model. In previous work
[9], we proposed a new physical layer protocol to generate group keys within cooperative scenarios
while exploiting all the available physical links in a small full mesh topology and reducing over-the-air
traffic with respect to other cooperative higher layer PLKG methods. The main idea consists in adjusting
the IR-UWB signals usually transmitted for channel probing so that a target node -and only this node-
, can have access to non-observable channels corresponding to its non-adjacent links.2 In this way, a
collaborative node can discreetly whisper a channel to one of its neighbors that does not have physical
access to it. This operation leads to a deconvolution problem in the case of IR-UWB, for which we now
discuss various solutions that have not been investigated in the initial work [9] [10]. Firstly, we show
that the maximum-likelihood (ML) approaches to the deconvolution problem are not stable with respect
to imperfect channel impulse response (CIR) estimates. Then, we introduce a parametrized maximum a
posteriori (MAP) solution and we analyze two automatic methods for parameterization: Cross Validation
(CV) and Expectation Maximization (EM).
The paper starts with an overview of pairwise PLKG followed by a description of the state of the
art cooperative key generation methods and a synopsis of our contributions and the limitations of our
work (Section II). In Section III we introduce the system model and definitions. Our main contributions
are detailed in Section IV starting with the protocol description (Section IV-A) and continuing with
the deconvolution options to compute the optimized transmitted signal (Section IV-B). In Section V the
deconvolution solutions are compared and the proposed protocol is analyzed in terms of traffic complexity,
key length gains, and average bit matching. Finally, section VI concludes the paper and discusses the
perspectives.
1The physical channel is not truly random but it is perceived as random because of the prohibitive complexity of exact deterministic signal
reconstruction based on the precise environment characterization especially for IR-UWB (e.g., by ray tracing methods [8]).
2Non-adjacent links are links between other nodes in the network.
3II. RELATED WORK
A. Single-link physical layer key generation
Secret key generation based on the physical layer in wireless communications is a particular case of
information theoretic secret generation, a more general framework that consists of two main models: the
source and the channel models [7]. In the following we will only describe the source model, to which
our work belongs.
Radio propagation characteristics can be used as common source of information for secret key agreement
[11]. Due to the unpredictable fading realizations and to the reciprocity of the propagation of electromag-
netic waves, the wireless channel between two legitimate users represents a common source of randomness
that can be exploited to separately generate a secret key and agree on it through public discussion. A
common assumption is that any eavesdropper, situated in a sufficiently distant position with respect to the
legitimate users, observes an uncorrelated channel and, therefore, will not be able to generate the same
key. A typical point-to-point sequential key generation algorithm consists of [7]:
• Randomness sharing (e.g., from channel probing).
• Advantage distillation, an optional step that aims at selecting the channel probes for which the
legitimate users consider to have an advantage with respect to an eavesdropper (not needed in the
considered source model thanks to the reciprocity and the spatial decorrelation properties).
• Information reconciliation meant to correct the mismatches due to asymmetric equipment, noise,
interferences and temporally distant half-duplex communications by using exchanges over a public
channel; this step is usually preceded or jointly implemented with a quantization phase, which
transforms values issued from channel measurements into binary flows.
• Privacy amplification: deterministic processing of the common bit sequences in order to generate
a secure secret-key by “compensating” the information leakage on the public channel (e.g., hash
functions or randomness extractors).
The trade-offs arising in single-link physical layer key generation have been studied for different
technologies and channel metrics: received signal strength (RSS) [12], OFDM coefficients [13] [14],
IR-UWB channel responses [15] [16] [17].
The aforementioned methods provide a symmetric key shared by only two nodes (i.e., point-to-point)
and generated from a single communication channel (i.e., single link). The channel can be also probed in
time (over successive transmissions) for obtaining longer keys or for refreshing keys but the performance
is dependent on the channel coherence time (e.g., in mobility cases).
Therefore, an elementary issue for physical layer key generation is how to gather more entropy from
channel measurements during a limited amount of time when the channel can be considered static. This
leads to the idea of extending the key generation process to several nodes in order to exploit more physical
links (cooperative/multi-link strategy) and/or to generate a group key (contrary to a point-to-point key).
However, the solution should be scalable, adapted to ad hoc scenarios and should avoid the high level
complexity issues of classical key distribution techniques (e.g., key pre-distribution, latency, etc.).
B. Multi-link physical layer key generation
The secret key capacities for the source model with multiple terminals including a subset of helpers,
various extents of an eavesdropper’s knowledge, and unrestricted public discussion have been characterized
from an information theoretic perspective [18]. First, it has been shown that the secret key capacity when
the eavesdropper only observes the public exchanges without having any side information regarding the
source is closely related to the multiterminal source coding problem with no secrecy constraints. Then,
the expression of the secret key capacity when the eavesdropper wiretaps a subset of the helpers has been
also derived.
Multi-terminal or cooperative secret key generation has also been investigated for less complex systems
with the aim to design practical protocols and to measure their performance. One early study on the
4topic presents an extension of the source model to cooperative pairwise key agreement and group key
generation in a pairwise independent network (i.e., a network in which the point-to-point channels are
independent) [19]: point-to-point keys are generated from each physical network link and the group keys
(or extra secret bits for pairwise cooperative keys) are propagated through XOR-ing operations over a
graph representation of the network.
Other authors propose to generate the secret key between two user nodes with the help of a relay
[20] [21]. First, non-cooperative pairwise keys (from the main channel and the side channels, i.e., the
channels between each node and the relay) are generated using a typical key distillation procedure based
on channel gains [20] or phase estimations [21]. At this point, each user node holds the key from the main
channel and a key from a side channel. After that, the relay, which holds the keys obtained from both side
channels, publicly broadcasts the bitwise combination of those keys. The user nodes can therefore recover
the key that was generated by the other user node and the relay and append one of these side channel
keys to the main channel key. An equivalent approach based on pairwise keys is described in parallel
work [22], where the received signal strength is quantized for non-cooperative pairwise key generation
and a group key, generated by a root node, is securely distributed in the network using the pairwise keys.
If the wireless channels are static in time or too sparse in terms of multipath, there might not be enough
information to harvest in order to generate a robust secret key. In order to deal with the issue of limited
entropy of the source model, a more recent study [23] extends the channel model for key generation to
a cooperative scenario with a relay and an eavesdropper that is collocated with the relay. The authors
derive the upper and lower bound for the secret key rate with a relay and propose a joint optimized
design of the various key generation phases (advantage distillation, information reconciliation and privacy
amplification) while focusing on the trade-off between security and protocol efficiency. Although it is
shown that collocating with the relay is the worst case scenario for the secret key rate, this assumption
also facilitates the advantage distillation phase because the legitimate users are informed about the quality
of the eavesdropper’s signal by the cooperative relay.
C. Contributions and limitations
Overall, the aforementioned work on cooperative pairwise/group keys rely on the initial pairwise single-
link key generation and subsequent key distribution. This involves extra-traffic and latency, while the
length of the group key can be limited by the shortest pairwise keys. Herein, we describe a method of
physical layer group key generation that avoids the pairwise key generation before group key generation.
An alternative way to deal with the entropy limitation in the case of the source model would be to
use multiple links as input signals for quantization. The final group key is obtained after quantization
and reconciliation of a concatenation of measurements from several links. The protocol involves several
cooperative nodes and the obtained key is by construction known to all the participants, so it becomes a
group key. This solution avoids extra public communication overhead but comes with an expense on the
signal processing side where supplementary operations for channel probing are needed.
The indirect probing of a non-adjacent channel is possible because of the cooperation between nodes,
which will send specific signals (called s-signals in the following) in order to whisper a certain channel
state to the receiver. This operation depends on the type of measured signal; in the case of IR-UWB channel
responses, which we will use for illustration purposes, the operation consists in a deconvolution operation,
which is one of the scenarios with the highest complexity. This could be nonetheless acceptable for current
personal devices such as smartphones and possibly even for next generation wireless sensors. The general
concept and the protocol are however applicable to different technologies and channel measurements,
which would require less complex signal processing capabilities (e.g., quotient operations).
It should be noted that similar concepts (e.g., IR-UWB time-reversal [24]) have been put forward for
improved communication robustness and intrinsic signal secrecy by spatial focusing of the signal energy.
These methods rely on pre-filtering on the transmitter side and thus, enable location-dependent SNR gains
on the receiver side. However, they are neither intended to provide secret material, such as keys, to higher
layer cryptographic functions nor used in cooperative protocols as described in our method.
5It has been brought to our knowledge that ideas similar to our whispering concept have been studied
before [25] or in parallel [26] to our initial work [9] [10]. In a sense, channel whispering is more general
than the aforementioned studies because they deal with the RSS metric [25] or narrow-band frequency-
flat fading channels [26] for which the whispering is equivalent to subtraction and quotient operations
respectively. Moreover, the group key generated for the star and chain topologies [25] depends only on
one shared physical channel. This limitation is surpassed in [26] where a more general model than ours
is given for group key generation in a mesh network (selection of the used channels for key generation,
whispering of a weighted combination of different estimated channels with optimized coefficients, different
quantization schemes including vector quantization). Also, a similar approach is taken in recent work but
from an attacker point of view [27].
a) Contributions: To sum up, the main contributions of our work on cooperative PLKG are:
• a cooperative protocol to generate a secret group key within the source model of the paradigm of
physical layer key generation [9] [10];
• the evaluation of several temporal deconvolution solutions required for the application of the coop-
erative protocol to the IR-UWB physical layer (one of the most challenging for the cooperative key
generation purpose), thus assessing the feasibility and the robustness of the solution;
• a signal model for EM-based deconvolution that can be extended to include a channel estimation
error model;
• a complete comparison of the proposed group key generation protocol to an alternative approach based
on group key distribution. This comparison extends the previous results [9] by adding a general traffic
analysis for an arbitrary number of nodes in the network, emphasizing thus the scalability aspects.
b) Limitations: The present work focuses on the signal-processing aspects of the achievement of
common randomness in IR-UWB mesh networks. However, it could be improved by analyzing the
following “more” information-theoretic or experimental aspects:
• leakage analysis: although the channel of the eavesdropper is considered uncorrelated with the
legitimate channel, the eavesdropper can recover the s-signal by deconvolution. Despite being highly
insufficient to deduce the whispered channel, this information leakage should be quantified and used
in the design of the privacy amplification scheme.
• scaling of the recovery noise with the number of nodes: in our work we present the scaling of the
traffic packets with the number of nodes in a mesh network but the key rate is hindered by the
deconvolution noise which also scales with the number of nodes. This aspect could be incorporated
in a general analysis of the secret key rate.
• realistic measurements and synchronization issues: our study could be completed by using real IR-
UWB measurements from small mesh networks or ray-tracing generated signals and artificial noise
[8]. Also, the synchronization issues, which have not been discussed here as explained further (Section
V-B), can have a great impact of the overall performance of the algorithm. This is a common issue
to all key generation scheme [28] but its impact could be different in cooperative scenarios and
depending on the processing of the received signal before key generation.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a full mesh topology consisting of three nodes (A, B, and C) with direct IR-UWB links
between each pair. The received signal can be expressed as
yuv(t) = (su ∗ huv)(t) + wv(t), with wv(t) ∼ N (0, σ2w) (1)
huv(t) =
K∑
k=1
xkδ(t− τk) (2)
where yuv(t) of duration Tw is a general convolved noisy received signal between the transmitter u ∈
{A,B,C} and the receiver v 6= u, v ∈ {A,B,C} (later the convolved signal will be denoted as y or
6r depending on the transmitted signal), su(t) is a general signal transmitted by node u (e.g., a pulse
waveform p(t) of temporal support [0, Tp] employed for channel sounding or another signal used for
channel whispering), huv is the channel impulse response between u and v, xk and τk are respectively
the amplitude and delay associated with the kth (k ∈ {1, ..K}) multipath component of the CIR between
u and v, wv(t) is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the receiver v.
Our key generation protocol employs all the three available channels in order to generate a secret group
key between the three nodes. In the following, we give some definitions and remarks concerning the
present system model.
Definition 1. We arbitrarily define the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) as the ratio between the power of the
transmitted pulse over its temporal definition domain and the noise power, assuming that all the CIRs are
normalized in energy:3
SNR = Ppulse
Pnoise
=
1
Tp
∫ Tp
0 p
2(t) dt
σ2w
(3)
Definition 2. An adjacent channel is the channel that can be directly measured by a node (e.g., channels
[A−C] and [B−C] for node C). Accordingly, a non-adjacent channel is a channel that cannot be directly
measured by a node (e.g., channel [A−B] for node C).
Definition 3. We denote as channel probe the necessary operations in order for all the nodes to acquire
the needed signals for key generation (i.e, adjacent and non-adjacent channels).
Remark 1 (Reciprocity and spatial decorrelation). The channels (hAB, hAC , and hBC) are considered
reciprocal (huv = hvu) and pairwise independent at a given channel probing time. Although the assumption
on the CIR reciprocity is admitted in static environments, some distortions can be induced for the convolved
CIRs by the realistic radios with asymmetric amplifiers, filters etc. or by half-duplex channel sounding
of each channel. Nevertheless, the reciprocity, the temporal correlation at small temporal scales despite
half-duplex sounding, and the spatial decorrelation between different channels are supported by previous
experimental studies [29] [30] [15], which have shown that IR-UWB channels are sufficiently reciprocal
and spatially uncorrelated when the three nodes are reasonably distant. However, spatial decorrelation is
difficult to assess in a general manner because it is directly impacted by the physical environment: the
higher the complexity of the physical environment, the more diverse the multipath propagation profiles,
and thus the lower the spatial correlation. For our tests, we have employed independent statistical IR-
UWB channel realizations based on modified versions of the Saleh-Valenzuela model, namely the IEEE
802.15.4a channel models [31].
Remark 2 (Temporal independence). It is assumed that the channels vary from one channel probe to
the next one independently of the past channel realizations. The proposed group key generation protocol
must be performed only once within the coherence period of the physical channels (i.e., the time over
over which the physical channels are static). Depending on the channel probing operations, some protocol
variants (e.g., EM-based deconvolution) could need longer coherence times, while others (e.g., MAP-based
deconvolution) would be more adapted to dynamic environments.
IV. COOPERATIVE PHYSICAL LAYER KEY GENERATION
We start by illustrating the proposed cooperative key generation (CKG) algorithm in a group of three
interconnected nodes (Section IV-A). Since the channel probing step will require a deconvolution operation,
we analyze several options to achieve this (Section IV-B). For readability reasons, we employ a continuous
time framework for the protocol description and we switch to the realistic discrete case when discussing
the deconvolution.
3∫ Tw
0
h2(t) dt = 1.
7A. Protocol description
In the following, A, B, and C have different roles and the protocol must be repeated with interchanged
roles in order to obtain a group key. For a given protocol cycle, we define A as the cooperator, B as
the initiator and C as the generator. It is assumed that the radio transmissions between each transmitter
and each receiver are preliminarily synchronized at the signal level (e.g., using specific heading). The
CKG protocol consists of several phases representing adjacent channel probing, non-adjacent channel
whispering, and key generation:
A B
C
Steps 1B and 1C
AStep 2
A B
C
Step 3
MPC 
extraction
s-signal
computation
A B
C
Steps 1A and 1B
Fig. 1. Physical layer cooperative key generation between three nodes.
• Adjacent channel probing: channel sounding using a pulse template signal to obtain adjacent channel
responses for the generator C (yAC and yBC) and for the cooperator A (yBA and yCA) according to
Eq. (1). This phase can be achieved with three successive broadcast transmissions from each node
denoted as 1A, 1B, and 1C in Figure 1.
• Non-adjacent channel whispering:
– CIR estimation (i.e., delay and amplitude extraction) at the cooperator A from the received
yCA (Step 2 in Figure 1). This operation can be achieved by sampling at frequency Fs and
correlation with an a priori pulse template (corresponding to the expected unitary received
pulse waveform p(t)). For example, the search-subtract-readjust algorithm [32] employed herein
iteratively detects, estimates and then subtracts multipath components out of the acquired received
signal yCA to obtain hˆCA.
– computation of the so-called s-signal sAC at the cooperator A (Step 2 in Figure 1). The previous
channel estimate hˆCA is used by the cooperator A to compute sAC to be sent to the generator
C so that the latter deduces out of its received signal only the non-adjacent channel [B − A]
represented by yBA.4 The problem needs to be solved at the cooperator A is:
Find sAC s.t. (sAC ∗ hˆCA)(t) = yBA(t) (4)
4The received signal at the generator is ideally close to the non-adjacent channel of the generator.
8– transmission of the computed s-signal sAC from A to C (Step 3 in Figure 1). Accordingly, the
employed transmitter must enable the programming of an arbitrary IR-UWB waveform, given
an a priori occupied bandwidth and a power spectral density limitation (e.g., [33]), in order to
generate sAC . The generator C receives:
rBA(t) = (sAC ∗ hAC)(t) + wAC(t) (5)
Steps 2-3 can be performed having as cooperator both A and B because they can both measure
C’s non-adjacent channel [B − A] ≈ [A− B]. If both of them send an s-signal, supplementary
processing can be used at C to coherently take advantage of the two incoming signals rBA and
rAB in order to obtain a more reliable version of the non-adjacent channel. This extension is not
discussed in the present work. Further, steps 2-3 are repeated by all the nodes with interchanged
roles so that all of them obtain the non-adjacent channels (i.e., we simply perform three circular
rotations).
• Key generation:
– processing of all the acquired signals at the generator C (i.e., two direct adjacent channel
observations and one non-adjacent channel reconstruction). At this point, C has the signals
corresponding to all three channels. These signals are further processed (e.g., through windowing
for removing irrelevant parts of the signal, signal squaring, low-pass filtering and down-sampling
at frequency Fp, compatible with the multipath resolution capability allowed by the signal
bandwidth). This processing is preferable in order to obtain signals whose quantization is more
robust with respect to mismatches. The generator C then concatenates the three signals to obtain
the input quantization signal SCAB. The concatenation order can be defined arbitrarily, according
to the node ID or based on radio parameters that can be extracted from the three radio signals
(e.g., delay spread, mean excess delay or kurtosis as long as these macroscopic radio features
are sufficiently reproducible at all nodes).
– quantization of the input signal SCAB using, e.g., uniform quantization with guard-bands.
– public discussion between the three nodes: i) sharing the indexes of the dropped samples falling
into the guard-bands; ii) error correction using Reed-Solomon codes (a lead node, for example
A, generates a syndrome representing its own bit sequence and sends it over the public channel
to the other nodes, which will try to decode/correct their bit sequences to align them to A’s
sequence).
B. Deconvolution
Searching for a solution to Eq. (4) is a non-trivial deconvolution problem. We restrict our analysis
to the temporal domain of IR-UWB signals in order to avoid supplementary processing incurred by the
Fourier Transform, but also because of the richness of data processing techniques concerning deconvolution
in similar domains (e.g., statistical spatial methods for image deconvolution). We will first present the
problem formulation and then explore several solutions.
1) Problem formulation: As mentioned before, the cooperator needs to solve Eq. (4), which is now
rewritten in discrete form without the node indexes for readability purposes:
Hˆs = y (6)
where y is the N × 1 sampled version of the generator’s non-adjacent channel yBA(t), s is the searched
s-signal of Ns samples, Hˆ is the N ×Ns matrix corresponding to the Nh × 1 convolution kernel hˆ such
that Hˆs = hˆ ∗ s. The sampling frequency of these signals is denoted as Fs, the same frequency being
used for the previous CIR estimation of hˆ.
Proposition 1. In order to ensure the existence of a solution to the deconvolution problem in Eq. (6), the
number of samples of the s-signal should be Ns = N +Nh − 1.
9Proof. Considering the classical discrete convolution definition, Ns should be N −Nh + 1. This leads to
an overdetermined system of equations, which is consistent (i.e., has one or an infinity of solutions) only
if a certain number of equations are linear combinations of the rest of the equations. As the coefficients
from Hˆ are random by construction, the present system has high chances of being inconsistent, depending
on the channel.
Consequently, we give the s-signal more degrees of freedom by imposing that only the valid part of the
convolution5 approaches y, which implies that Ns = N+Nh−1. Eq. (6) becomes then an underdetermined
system, which can have zero or an infinity of solutions.
According to the Rouche´–Capelli theorem of linear algebra, a system of linear equations with Ns
variables has a solution if and only if the rank of its coefficient matrix (Hˆ) is equal to the rank of its
augmented matrix ([Hˆ|y]). This is true with a high probability in our case because we consider that
IR-UWB channels are spatially uncorrelated, and thus Hˆ and y are uncorrelated. This implies that adding
the extra column y in the coefficient matrix Hˆ will not change the rank.
2) Deconvolution solutions: From a numerical point of view, we need to find an algorithm that provides
a solution to our deconvolution problem and check whether it is suitable in the context of uncertain channel
estimates represented by Hˆ. Several least squares formulations are presented in the present section and
their performance is assessed in Section V-B.
Solution 1. A maximum likelihood solution (ML):
sML = argmin
s
||y − Hˆs||2 (7)
sML = (HˆTHˆ)−1HˆTy (8)
Despite its simplicity, this solution is shown to be instable with respect to the uncertain channel estimates.
Solution 2. A maximum a posteriori solution, in which we add a weighted constraint on the searched
s-signal (MAP):6
sMAP = argmin
s
||y − Hˆs||2 + λ||Ps||2 (9)
sMAP = (HˆTHˆ+ λPTP)−1HˆTy (10)
The instability issue of the ML solution can be efficiently addressed by adding a penalty term. This
operation is known as a Tikhonov regularization, where matrix P is chosen in order to constrain s and
λ is a real scalar trade-off parameter also referred to as weight in the following. The penalty term, also
called prior in a Bayesian setting, enforces the desired characteristics of the optimized s-signal (e.g.,
minimal l2-norm, smoothness, etc.), while the first term keeps the result after convolution close to the
target channel y. In our tests, we have chosen to minimize the norm of the searched signal s by using
P = INs since we do not have other a priori information about it. From an implementation point of view,
it would have been preferable to use a smooth prior but the accuracy of this type of prior depends on the
sampling frequency and can be false resulting in a high penalty of the data fit.
Solution 3. The aforementioned MAP solution with a cross-validation technique in order to set the weight
of the constraint (MAP-CV).
Cross-validation (CV) methods are statistical tools for model validation, i.e., they are employed to
evaluate how well a given model will generalize to unknown variations in the data set. Given a known
data set of size N (in our case, the channel estimates Hˆ of size N × Ns and the target channel y of
size N × 1), a basic cross-validation procedure splits it randomly into a training set of indexes T and a
validation set of indexes V such that V ∩T = ∅;V ∪T = {1, . . . , N}. First, Eq. (10) is solved using only
5The valid part of a deconvolution represents the samples of the central part of the convolution, where the two input signals overlap
entirely. These samples are obtained from the summing of min(Ns, Nh) non-zero terms.
6The MAP terminology comes from the right term in Eq. (9) which could be understood as a prior over the s-signal.
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the training data set. Then, the found solution st(λ), is plugged into the given model for the validation
set and the performance is evaluated via the generalization error from Eq. (11). The optimal CV λ value
in a fixed range [λmin, λmax] is the one that minimizes the generalization error ∆g(λ).
∆g(λ) = ||Hˆvst(λ)− yv|| (11)
λ∗ = argmin
λ∈[λmin,λmax]
∆g(λ) (12)
Solution 4. An expectation maximization solution, which introduces a Bayesian model for the deconvo-
lution problem and provides a joint estimation of its parameters (EM).
In order to apply Bayesian techniques for jointly estimating the s-signal and the prior weight, we create
a statistical model corresponding to the regularized deconvolution equation. We identify the known data
as the target signal (y) and the hidden data as the searched s-signal (s). The estimated channel (Hˆ) is
considered a deterministic fixed quantity in the present model. Thus, we have two equations: one for the
data fit, where e represents the fitting error with independent samples of mean 0 and variance 2, and
one for the signal prior, which offers an artificial representation of the resulting waveform as a noisy
zero-mean process of sample variance γ2. By identification with the MAP solution, we get 2/γ2 = λ.
Although the MAP solution expressed in Eq. (10) depends only on the value of λ, the present model
provides a richer description of the underlying phenomena because the two model parameters ( and γ)
have a concrete meaning (i.e.,  represents the capacity of the model to fit the known data and γ can
represent, for example, the energy of the searched signal).
y = Hˆs+ e, with e ∼ N (0, 2IN) (13)
Ps ∼ N (0, γ2INs) (14)
Signal estimation using a model with unknown parameters can be solved by an Expectation Maxi-
mization (EM) algorithm. EM has been discovered and used independently in several domains ranging
from genetics, statistics (estimation of parameters of mixture distributions) to maximum likelihood image
reconstruction and speech recognition (estimation of parameters of Hidden Markov models) [34], [35],
[36]. This iterative algorithm alternates between two steps: i) E-step solving for the hidden variables
(s) knowing the latest parameter estimates (, γ) and the given data (y); ii) M-step finding the optimal
parameters, knowing the current signal estimation and the given data. The convergence can be proved by
showing that the algorithm increases the likelihood at each iteration [37]. Therefore, we can write Bayes’
rule for the new model and apply the EM algorithm at each iteration step i as follows:
p(s|y, , γ) = p(y|s, )× p(s|γ)
p(y|, γ) (15)
E-step: ξi(, γ) = Es|y,i−1,γi−1 [ln p(y, s|, γ)] (16)
M-step: (i, γi) = arg max
(,γ)
ξi(, γ) (17)
After the developments detailed in Appendix A, at iteration i we obtain a mean signal µis = E[s], its
associated covariance Σis, and the model parameters i and γi:
Σis = (
−2
i−1Hˆ
THˆ+ γ−2i−1P
TP)−1 (18)
µis = 
−2
i−1Σ
i
sHˆ
Ty (19)
i =
√
yTy − 2yTHˆµis + Tr(HˆTHˆΣis) + µisTHˆTHˆµis
N
(20)
γi =
√
Tr(PTPΣis) + µ
i
s
TPTPµis
Ns
(21)
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V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we will present the simulation framework (Section V-A) followed by illustrative and
statistical evaluations of the deconvolution solutions (Section V-B). Finally, in Section V-C, we compare
our key generation protocol to a benchmark method inspired by the literature by analyzing the generated
traffic and the bit agreement prior to key generation. Note that the public discussion and the reconciliation
phases will not be evaluated herein because the focus of this work is on the acquisition of the physical layer
signals necessary for quantization as an alternative to higher level key distribution using the physical layer.
Thus, operations that are subsequent to quantization do not influence the comparison of the protocols.
A. Simulation setup
After computing the s-signal at the sampling resolution defined by Fs = 10 GHz, we simulate the
pseudo-analog s-waveform sAC(t) by sinc-interpolation in order to obtain a simulation frequency of 100
GHz. The obtained waveform is next convolved with the true multipath channel hAC(t). Our tests have
been performed for arbitrary realizations of CM1 channels corresponding to indoor line-of-sight IR-UWB
links according to the IEEE 802.15.4a standard [31]. The CIR realizations have been normalized in energy
and only the excess delay part has been considered by ignoring the absolute delays due to the inter-node
distances.
a) ML and MAP.: In terms of implementation, the least squares solutions of Eq. (8) and Eq. (10)
are found using MATLAB R©’s linear least squares solver mldivide, which employs the QR factorization
and provides a solution s with the fewest possible non-zero components.
b) MAP and MAP-CV.: As explained previously, we choose P = INs corresponding to a minimiza-
tion of the signal energy since a prior matrix corresponding to a differential kernel [1,−1]T would be
adapted at higher sampling frequencies Fs when the signal can be considered smooth. Regarding the cross
validation routine, for each channel configuration we employed 20 random partitions with the common
CV-splitting percentages (70% training data and 30% validation data).
c) EM.: The number of iterations of the EM algorithm is set to 30 after empirical observation of
the convergence mechanism. The values of the initial parameters are arbitrarily set to  = γ = 1.
B. Deconvolution performance
In this section, we aim to describe the degradation produced by the imperfect channel estimation hˆCA 6=
hCA for each deconvolution solution. To this end, we quantify the performance of the deconvolution
solutions with the root mean squared error (RMSE) between the pseudo-analog noiseless received signal
(sAC ∗ hAC)(t) and the target signal yBA(t). Note that the receiver should perform additional windowing
and synchronization operations since the sent s-signal is longer than the needed observation window.
For our results, we have performed preliminary idealized correlation-based signal-level synchronization
in order to separate the aspects related to signal reconstruction from the synchronization issues, which do
not fall in to the scope of the paper.
First, we show an illustrative example using particular channel realizations (hAB, hAC) denoted as
channel configurations (C). Then, the aggregated results of RMSE over 5000 channel configurations are
given.
1) Illustrative example: A value of SNR = 20 dB is employed for the received signals yBA(t), yCA(t)
before channel estimation (hˆCA) and s-signal computation. No noise is added after the transmission of
the s-signal because for now we only focus on the reconstruction capability of the non-adjacent channel
regardless of the noise conditions on the last involved link. Figures 2-3 show a comparison between the
target signal that should be reconstructed at C, yBA(t), and the noiseless received signal at C, (sAC∗hAC)(t),
for several deconvolution solutions: ML, MAP with two different weight parameters λ ∈ {1, 0.01}, EM
initiated with  = γ = 1, and MAP-CV.
The signal instability observed for the ML solution in Figure 2(a) can be regarded as an over-fitting
issue: the s-signal is computed based on the imperfect channel estimation hˆ but the final performance
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(a) ML solution (RMSE = 0.243)
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(b) MAP solution λ = 1 (RMSE = 0.067)
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(c) MAP solution λ = 0.01 (RMSE = 0.055)
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(d) EM solution (RMSE = 0.058)
Fig. 2. Comparison of various deconvolution solutions for a sample channel configuration C0 (target signal in black and received signal in
colour)
depends on the unknown real channel h(t). This means that even though the ML deconvolution solution is
exact for the given data (channel estimates and target channel), it could behave unpredictably for slightly
different real channel conditions (equivalent to variations in the channel estimates). Although it is not
always the case, we have chosen a particular channel configuration in which the ML solution is unstable
in order to give an intuitive explanation of the final results.
Adding the penalty term using the MAP solution avoids the over-fitting. However, the performance is
highly dependent on the weight λ as shown in Figures 2(b)-2(c). We conclude that for this particular
channel configuration the regularization works as intended at small λ values, but degrades for higher λ
values, when the prior obtains too much weight and starts flattening the signal (s→ 0).
The solutions that include an automatic parameter setting are EM and MAP-CV. As illustrated for the
channel configuration C0 in Figure 2(d), EM converges to an intermediate solution in terms of RMSE
(e.g., equivalent λ = 0.35 for C0). On the contrary, the MAP-CV solution is rather unreliable as shown
in Figure 3 for two extreme channel configurations C1 and C2. The generalization error (Figure 4) does
not always have a minimum and, therefore, model selection using CV does not have optimal performance
for all channel configurations. This could be explained by the small size of the data set on which cross-
validation is applied when the signals are sampled (500 samples). In certain cases, the validation samples
can be insufficient or inadequate to “generalize” the estimation of the s-signal to the unknown real channel
conditions.
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(a) MAP-CV solution for C1 (RMSE = 0.061)
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(b) MAP-CV solution for C2 (RMSE = 0.102)
Fig. 3. MAP-CV solutions for two sample channel configurations C1,C2 (target signal in black and received signal in colour)
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Fig. 4. MAP-CV generalization error for two sample channel configurations C1,C2
2) Aggregated results: First, in Figures 5(a)-5(b) we present the cumulative distribution (CDF) of the
RMSE of the unprocessed signals (as illustrated in the previous section) and of the normalized signals
with respect to their maximum value. As before, a value of SNR = 20 dB is employed for the received
signals yBA(t), yCA(t) before channel estimation (hˆCA) and s-signal computation and no noise is added
after the transmission of the s-signal. Signal normalization before computing the RMSE is performed in
order to look beyond the flattening effect of the regularization. However, the classification of the various
deconvolution solutions with respect to their performance is unchanged when normalizing the signals.
This confirms the fact that the differences are not just a consequence of the different flattening factors
but of the structural differences of the signals issued from each method. The same conclusion is given
by the cumulative distribution of the correlation coefficients in Figure 6: the correlation coefficients are
used instead of the RMSE for the same signals in order to provide another means of comparison.
On a relative scale, the ML, MAP-CV and some manually tuned MAP solutions (i.e., at large λ values)
give the poorest results. It can be also be inferred that at low λ values, the MAP estimator has slightly
higher performance than the EM solution. However, it is relatively “unfair” to compare a solution that
gives an estimation of the signal and of the model parameters (EM) with one that takes as an input a
favorable manually tuned parameter and provides only an estimation of the s-signal.
Then, in Figure 7, the results corresponding to entirely noisy scenarios are given. An entirely noisy
scenario is defined by adding noise before channel estimation (as before) and after s-signal transmission
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(b) Cumulative distribution RMSE (normalized signals)
Fig. 5. Aggregated RMSE results (noise before estimation only)
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Fig. 6. Correlation results (noise before estimation only)
corresponding to a given SNR. As expected the RMSE becomes larger for low SNR values. From the
RMSE values strictly it can be inferred that at lower SNR (10 dB), the EM-based solution outperforms
the MAP solution with manual parameter λ = 0.01. However, this is not the case in terms of correlation
for lower SNR as it can be seen from Figure 8(b).
To sum up, the performance achieved by the EM solution with the considered model are comparable
or inferior to a manual tuning of the trade-off parameter (i.e., choosing a constant very small prior weight
irrespective of the channel configuration). This might suggest that the incurred complexity of the EM
solution is unnecessary. However, the EM framework presents several advantages that cannot be achieved
by any of the alternative solutions:
• computation of the uncertainty related to the s-signal estimation (see Appendix A), potentially
exploitable by the subsequent quantization layer.
• comparison between different prior models in a more complex scenario (e.g., another example of
prior could be the information about arbitrary regulatory emission masks compulsory for over-the-air
transmissions).
• joint s-signal estimation and channel estimation (hˆCA) if supplementary information about the channel
estimation error model is available. In this case, the hidden variable would be the pair (s,h) and the
resulting s-signal is expected to take into account the uncertainty in the channel estimation that is
responsible for the observed artifacts.
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Fig. 7. Aggregated RMSE results in entirely noisy scenarios
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(a) Correlation coefficients (SNR = 20 dB)
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Fig. 8. Correlation results in entirely noisy scenarios
C. Protocol performance
The proposed physical layer key generation protocol (CKG) is compared to a benchmark physical
layer key distribution method (CKD) in terms of exchanged packets (Section V-C2) or mean key lengths
(Section V-C4). We also report the mean bit agreement/matching between the acquired bit sequences
of the three parties for CKG before reconciliation (Section V-C4). The details concerning the quantized
signal are presented in Section V-C3.
1) Physical layer group key distribution (CKD): One way of extending the point-to-point source model
for key generation to several links and to a group key is to generate pairwise keys on each link and then
distribute a group key (similarly to [19]). CKD can be achieved in two phases.
• Each node generates a pairwise symmetric key with each of its neighbors based on the properties of
the radio channel. The employed key generation method is the same as for our protocol. Contrary to
CKG, the key generation for CKD is performed separately for each pair of nodes using only their
corresponding channels.
• A group key, generated by a lead node using a random number generator, is propagated in the
network by XOR-ing operations using the previous single-link keys. The security of the scheme
relies therefore on the single-link keys.
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2) Generated traffic: Table I compares the number of packets needed for CKD and CKG in a full mesh
network of N nodes when CKG is achieved with only one cooperator for each non-adjacent channel.
Broadcasting, denoted by ∗ in the table, is used when possible (i.e., pairwise channel probing, dropping
and error-correction for CKG). For CKG, a protocol based on the nodes’ IDs can be implemented in order
to send the necessary s-signals such that each node receives all its the non-adjacent channels only once
(e.g., each node i sends to a node j the s-signals corresponding to the channels i− k with k > i, k 6= j).
Then, the total number of exchanged packets for s-signal transmission is the difference between the total
number of channels in a full mesh network
(
N(N−1)
2
)
and the number of adjacent channels (N − 1).
The key distribution for CKD in a full mesh consists of N − 1 packets containing the encrypted group
key sent by the lead node to each other node. A lead node is necessary for both CKD and CKG but for
different reasons (reconciliation for CKG or distribution for CKD). We consider thus a generic protocol
that requires x packets for setting a lead node in a network (x can be 0 if it is established that the lead
node is the one with the smallest id).
Because of the cooperative channel probing phase, CKG is less scalable than CKD for N ≥ 5. However,
larger values of the number of nodes make it difficult to obtain a full mesh scenario and to establish a
key during the channel coherence time for both methods and they are thus less practical.
TABLE I
EXCHANGED PACKETS FOR ONE GROUP KEY GENERATION/DISTRIBUTION IN A FULL MESH OF N NODES
Phase/Method CKD CKG
Pairwise channel probing N∗ N∗
Transmission s-signals - N
[
N(N−1)
2
− (N − 1)
]
Reconciliation : set lead node - x
Reconciliation : dropping N(N − 1) N∗
Reconciliation : error-correction N(N−1)
2
1∗
Key distribution: set lead node x -
Key distribution N − 1 -
Total O(N2) + x O(N3) + x
3) Quantized signal: For the following simulations, we consider again N = 3. The reciprocal CIRs
corresponding to the three links are generated independently using the IEEE 802.15.4a statistical model for
LOS indoor environments (CM1). The transmitted pulse for initial channel probing p(t) has a bandwidth
of 1 GHz (defined at -10 dB of the Power Spectral Density) and a center frequency at 4.5 GHz. The
duration of the observation window is set at Tw = 50 ns. For CKG, the sampling frequency for CIR
estimation and for the computation of the s-signals is set at Fs = 10 GHz as before. The s-signal is
computed using the MAP solution with the regularization parameter set manually to λ = 0.01 dB and the
obtained s-signal is then filtered to conform with the required signal bandwidth and central frequency.
The input signal for quantization has a sampling frequency of Fp = 1/Tp and it is normalized with
respect to the minimum and the maximum values in order to obtain signal samples between 0 and 1 for
all nodes. An example of such a signal issued from link [A-C] and seen in A, B (based on the reception
of an s-signal), and C is provided in Figure 9. For simplicity reasons, we choose a two-bit uniform
quantization with corresponding cells {(0-0.25), (0.25-0.5), (0.5-0.75), (0.75-1)} and a Grey dictionary
({“00”, “01”, “11”, “10”}). The employed guard-bands (GB) vary between 0 and 0.1 around the borders
of the quantization cells.
4) Bit generation performance: The two protocols are compared in terms of the number of generated
bits after reconciliation for the same number of over-the-air packets (140 packets corresponding to 10
protocol rounds for CKD and 15 protocol rounds for CKG). As a penalty term, the keys that are not
equal after reconciliation are considered to have length 0. Averaging is performed over 500 channel
configurations, each configuration comprising three channel realizations corresponding to the three pairwise
links. As explained in Remark 2, the channels are independent from one round to another meaning that
the bits can be concatenated without introducing intra-key correlated binary patterns.
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Fig. 9. Typical input quantization signal seen by the three nodes (SNR= 20 dB)
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Fig. 10. Average key length difference CKG-CKD (key gain of CKG w.r.t. CKD)
From Figure 10, we conclude that CKG is usually more advantageous in terms of key length, especially
at higher SNR. The advantage is maximized at an optimal value of the guard-bands. This is due to the
fact that before quantization, the CKG method does not have direct access to the non-adjacent channel
measurements that are obtained after a deconvolution operation and another noisy transmission. This
degrades the reciprocity of the final samples and leads to more keys that are not agreed upon for CKG
at lower SNR or smaller guard-bands.
However, it can be verified that CKG achieves a relatively high bit matching ratio between the three
keys generated at the participating nodes (Figure 11(a)). The bit matching ratios for the CKD method
(Figure 11(b)), although higher than those for CKG, do not present an interest in this study because they
can only be computed for pairwise keys and represent solely the single-link reciprocity performance of
the system.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have investigated an alternative method for generating secret group keys using the
physical layer in IR-UWB systems without relying on classical pairwise key agreement and distribution.
For each node, we exploit the concatenation of adjacent and non-adjacent links in a mesh network in
order to gather more entropy before the quantization process.
Our contribution focuses on the parameterized estimation of specific s-signals emitted by cooperative
nodes in order to whisper non-adjacent channel information to their neighbors. We investigate the accuracy
of the non-adjacent signal reconstruction phase at the reception side, which is an important factor for
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Fig. 11. Average bit matching before reconciliation
subsequent key generation. Consequently, we describe and test two methods for joint maximum a posteriori
signal estimation and parameter specification. The first one is based on a cross validation technique with
the aim of choosing an optimal value for the MAP deconvolution solution, whereas the second one
applies the expectation maximization algorithm to obtain a joint estimation of the required signal and of
the parameters of the employed statistical model. We conclude that the MAP-CV solution is not robust
enough while MAP-EM has stable performance comparable to an advantageous manual tuning method
for the MAP parameter. Furthermore, the most attractive feature of the EM model lies in the possibility
of extending it to incorporate the channel estimation uncertainty prior to s-signal inference. We also
analyze the protocol scalability and show the advantages of our method compared to physical layer key
distribution in terms of traffic overhead for small cooperative groups and key length for certain parameter
configurations.
Further studies should look into the complexity issues of the s-signal generation from two perspectives:
software (execution time, band matrix inversions, iterations, etc.) and hardware (programmable transmitters
[33], signal dynamics, non-linearity, polarity, etc.). Also, from a key generation point of view, the bit
sequences should be further processed by information reconciliation and privacy amplification to obtain
final keys.
The proposed scheme can be adapted to other technologies (narrow-band, OFDM) by changing the
cooperative signal generation method according to the most relevant channel features. Moreover, the
concept of s-signal could be extended to cases where the target signals are not channel estimates but
randomly generated information, which leads to a mixed key generation model. However, this complicates
the overall key generation procedure because there would be no more direct acquisitions of channel
information.
APPENDIX A
THE EXPECTATION MAXIMIZATION SOLUTION
For tractability reasons, we consider a Gaussian distribution for the searched signal s. In order to obtain
s and the parameters  and γ, the EM algorithm requires two steps for each iteration i:
E-step: ξi(, γ) = Es|y,i−1,γi−1 [ln p(y, s|, γ)] (22)
M-step: (i, γi) = arg max
(,γ)
ξi(, γ) (23)
a) E-step.: At iteration i, the E-step requires two operations:
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• identification of the parameters (mean µs, and covariance Σs) of the searched signal s from the
expression of the conditional probability density p(s|y, i−1, γi−1) by factorizing the terms in s and
those in sTs from the exponential functions.
p(s) = p(s|y, i−1, γi−1) (24)
p(s) = (2pi)−
Ns
2 |Σs|− 12 e− 12 (s−µs)TΣ−1s (s−µs) (25)
p(s|y, i−1, γi−1) ∝ p(y|s, i−1)× p(s|γi−1) (26)
p(y|s, i−1) = (2pi2i−1)−
N
2 e
− 1
22
i−1
(y−Hˆs)T (y−Hˆs)
(27)
p(s|γi−1) = (2piγ2i−1)−
Ns
2 e
− 1
2γ2
i−1
(Ps)T (Ps)
(28)
sTΣ−1s s− 2µsTΣ−1s s+ ct = −2i−1(sTHˆTHˆs− 2yTHˆs+ ct) + γ−2i−1sTPTPs (29)
with ct a constant. This leads to the expression of the mean of the searched signal µs and its covariance
Σs:
Σs = (
−2
i−1Hˆ
THˆ+ γ−2i−1P
TP)−1 (30)
µs = 
−2
i−1ΣsHˆ
Ty (31)
• computation of the expectation based on µs and Σs and ignoring the terms that do not depend on
 and γ because they do not influence the maximization step. The index of Es|y,i−1,γi−1 will be
neglected for readability purposes.
ξi(, γ) = ct+ E[ln p(y|s, , γ)] + E[ln p(s|, γ)] (32)
= ct− 1
22
E[(y − Hˆs)T (y − Hˆs)]− N
2
ln(2pi2)
− 1
2γ2
E[(Ps)T (Ps)]− Ns
2
ln(2piγ2) (33)
= ct− 1
22
[yTy − 2yTHˆµs + Tr(HˆTHˆΣs) + µsTHˆTHˆµs]− N
2
ln(2pi2)
− 1
2γ2
[Tr(PTPΣs) + µs
TPTPµs]− Ns
2
ln(2piγ2)
ξi(, γ) = cte− 1
22
T1 − N
2
ln(2pi2)− 1
2γ2
T2 − Ns
2
ln(2piγ2) (34)
T1 = yTy − 2yTHˆµs + Tr(HˆTHˆΣs) + µsTHˆTHˆµs (35)
T2 = Tr(PTPΣs) + µs
TPTPµs (36)
b) M-step.: At iteration i, the M-step consists in the derivation with respect to  and γ:
T1
2
24
− N
2
4pi
2pi2
= 0 (37)
T2
2γ
2γ4
− Ns
2
4piγ
2piγ2
= 0 (38)
which leads to the final result:
i =
√
T1
N
(39)
γi =
√
T2
Ns
(40)
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